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Media Use and Source Trust among Muslims in Seven
Countries: Results of a Large Random Sample Survey
Abstract
Despite the perceived importance of media in the spread of and resistance against Islamist
extremism, little is known about how Muslims use different kinds of media to get
information about religious issues, and what sources they trust when doing so. This paper
reports the results of a large, random sample survey among Muslims in seven countries
Southeast Asia, West Africa and Western Europe, which helps fill this gap. Results show a
diverse set of profiles of media use and source trust that differ by country, with overall low
trust in mediated sources of information. Based on these findings, we conclude that mass
media is still the most common source of religious information for Muslims, but that trust
in mediated information is low overall. This suggests that media are probably best used to
persuade opinion leaders, who will then carry anti-extremist messages through more
personal means.
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Introduction
It is a widely held belief, perhaps even a truism, that media use plays a crucial role in the spread
of Islamist extremism among contested populations of Muslims all over the world. There are
statements by extremists that say as much. For example, it is common for extremists to speak of
a “media jihad.” One user on an extremist form stated: “The responsibility for media jihad is
great and there must be real awareness of this responsibility.”1 Another recent post in an
extremist message forum quotes Abu Hafs al-Sunni—believed to be a senior al Qaeda media
strategist—as saying “electronic jihad is the other side of the precious coin of jihad.” 2 His
organization has for years maintained an official media and public relations arm, as-Sahab, that
produces and releases videos through the internet, the mainstream media, and other channels.3
Paul concludes that Islamist extremists
“recognize influence as a primary operational objective, and they integrate operations
with related media requirements as a matter of course….Hezbollah innovatively
subjected “virtually all its military action to its propaganda and mass media
requirements.”4
Since Islamist extremists typically frame their influence attempts in religious terms, it is
important to know about Muslims’ consumption of media with respect to religious issues.
There is also a widely propagated narrative that the Internet is fueling social transformation in
virtually all domains and places around the globe. For instance, Dutton argues that “the Internet,
World Wide Web, mobile cellphones, digital television, and numerous other new electronic
information and communication technologies (ICTs) are opening fresh pathways for
transforming the way we live, work, learn, and communicate.”5 If true, this must apply as well to
radicals as well as to counter-radicals, and the mainstream.
At the same time, it is an open question how important the Internet is relative to other, more
traditional media. As we show below, in some places where Islamist extremism is a concern
there is little penetration of ICTs, meaning that print/broadcast media—and even old-fashioned
face-to-face communication—could still be the dominant channels for transmitting religious
information. Understanding the mix and importance of media is crucial for the success of
military and diplomatic strategic communication efforts to counter the radicalization efforts of
Islamist extremists.

1

For example, Nasir al-Qaeda, “Message to My Brothers, the Supporters of the Mujahidin on the Jihadist Forums,”
Ansar al-Mujahidin Network, August 29, 2012.
2
M. Maghrebi, “A conversation with the brother Abu-Hafs al-Sunni al-Sunni,” Global Jihad Network forum, March
2, 2012, available at http://www.aljahad.com/vb.
3
"Tracking Al-Qaida's Media Production Team," National Public Radio, July 11, 2006, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5548044.
4

Paul, Christopher. Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates: Origins, Concepts, and
Current Debates (New York: Praeger, 2011), 114.
5

William H. Dutton, Social Transformation in an Information Society: Rethinking Access to You and the World
(UNESCO, 2004), 13.
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Given this, it is quite surprising that so little is known about how Muslims engage the
contemporary media milieu and evaluate the sources of the messages these media carry. Paul
claims that Internet technology “has reached a critical mass in accessibility, with high-speed
Internet access available worldwide,”6 but we can find no evidence that this true for many
countries where Muslims are a majority, or where they are a significant minority and
extremism/counter-extremism are going concerns. We must also be careful to distinguish
between access and use. While there is some—albeit spotty—data available on media access,
there is very little available on use, as we will show. Therefore, our first research question asks:
RQ1: On what media do Muslims rely for information about religious issues?
Even if we had an answer to this question, it would not be enough to understand the ways in
which extremist or counter-extremist influence operates. Media are, after all, channels for
communication by individuals and groups. Just because someone receives a message through a
given channel, this does not mean they will take it to heart. Some research shows that people are
skeptical about information received through media in general, and that interpersonal
communication mediates acceptance of such information.7 Accordingly, we also also ask:
RQ2: What sources do Muslims trust for information about religious issues?
RQ3: What is the relationship between media relied upon and trust in sources?
In the next two sections we review what is currently known that may help answer our research
questions. Following that, we report results of a large random-sample study of Muslims in seven
countries in West Africa (Niger, Nigeria and Senegal), Western Europe (France, Germany and
UK), and Southeast Asia (Malaysia).8 We conclude by discussing implications of this research.

Media Use by Muslims
As we have already explained, little research exists on Muslims’ use of media. What is available
comes primarily from data produced by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). ITU
is an increasingly active organization which “covers the whole ICT sector, from digital
broadcasting to the Internet, and from mobile technologies to 3D TV.9 In 2001 the UN endorsed
the World Summit on the Information Society which sought to “establish the foundations for an
Information Society for all, reflecting the different interests at stake” and “find solutions and
reach agreements in the fields of Internet governance.”10 This summit called upon member states
to “…develop tools to provide statistical information on the information society” and as such
“…the United Nations in cooperation with many international organizations developed core ICT
indicators to measure both ICT infrastructure and usage in different sectors…”11
6

Paul, 115.
Spiro Kiousis, “Public Trust or Mistrust? Perceptions of Media Credibility in the Information Age,” Mass
Communicaiton and Society 4:4 (2001): 381-403.
8
See below under Methods—Participants for an explanation of country selection.
9
"ITU: Committed to connecting the world," International Telecommunications Union, November 25, 2013,
available at http://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx.
10
"World Summit on the Information Society Home," WSIS National Committee, November 25, 2013, available at
http://www.wsis.ae/en.
11
"Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology," November 25, 2013, available at
http://www.mcit.gov.eg.
7
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Because the ITU’s charge is to produce “indicators” for measurement of ICT development, the
majority of data that exists in developing countries is infrastructure statistics, and a great deal of
academic research on media in these countries is founded on this data. A number of
organizations draw from the data produced by ITU, often compiling it alongside independent
data. One prominent example is Internet World Stats12 which produces internet usage and
population statistics for all countries and regions of the world. Table 1 illustrates the increase of
internet connections in each of the countries examined in this study between 2000 and 2011, the
number of connections in comparison to population of each country, and the number of
Facebook users in comparison to the population of each country.
Table 1: Internet Users, Growth, Penetration, and Facebook Users of Selected Countries
Users in Dec
Users in Dec
Penetration (%
Country
Population
2000
2011
Pop.)
Facebook
France

65,102,719

50,290,226

77.20%

77.20%

23,544,460

Germany

81,471,834

67,364,898

82.70%

82.7%%

22,123,660

Malaysia

28,728,607

3,700,000

17,723,000

61.70%

12,365,780

Niger

16,344,687

5,000

128,749

0.80%

47,440

Nigeria

170,123,740 200,000

45,039,711

29.00%

5,051,520

Senegal

12,969,606

40,000

1,989,396

15.70%

665,880

UK

62,698,362

52,731,209

84.10%

84.10%

30,470,400

Note: Adapted from Internetworldstats.com, 2012.

Some media consumption research has been conducted separately of the aforementioned ITU
data. It is generally country-focused and thus is able to offer a valuable understanding specific
national contexts. Within this however, there is there is a substantial disparity in the amount of
scholarship between the European and African countries and research within Africa is somewhat
uneven in terms of both depth and bredth. In addition, the vast majority of scholarship
conducted in Europe examining media consumption amongst ethnic groups is framed in terms of
immigration and acculturation. Finally, very limited academic research has been conducted
looking at Niger specifically; however, given its internet penetration of less than <0.1%,13 this is
to be expected. In the remainder of this section we address what infrastructure and academic
research is available about countries that are included in the current study.

12

"Internet World Stats - Usage and Population Statistics," Miniwatts Marketing Group, November 26, 2013,
available at http://www.internetworldstats.com.
13

Ibid.
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Senegal
Senegal is categorized by the UN as one of the Least Developed Countries (LDC).14 A recent
study conducted by Columbia Business School as highlighted the importance of
telecommunications technology to the struggling Senegalese economy. In terms of ICT adoption
over the past 30 years, fixed telephony, personal computers, and fixed broadband have shown
poor growth since introduction in the mid-1990s have yet to rise above 5% penetration.15 In line
with many other developing countries, dial-up internet currently sits at around 16% penetration
and wireless phones at around 65%. Surprisingly, the telecommunications industry accounts for
over 10% of Senegal’s GDP. Wireless phones are one of the driving economies in Senegal,
where “for every 1% increase of mobile penetration, the annual average contribution to the GDP
is equal to 0.044%16. In terms of news consumption, Senegal is one of the few countries in
Africa where private news organizations are trusted more than public news organizations.17
Moreover Senegal also has the second highest ‘trust gap’ between private and public news
organizations, second only to Namibia.18
Nigeria
Nigeria has the highest number of internet users in Africa at around 45 million, yet sits third in
penetration at 29%, behind Morocco, Seychelles, and Reunion (FR).19 Interestingly, there is a
substantial amount of research regarding ICT in Nigeria. Over the past ten years a number of
studies have come forward specifically examining engagement with the internet. The Electronic
Library produced a special issue in 2005 looking specifically of ICT in Nigerian libraries. Ani,
Uchendu, and Atseye focus on understanding why people use the internet in the Calabar
Metropolis, and more specifically who does not use the internet and why. Their data indicate that
53% of use is for education/academic endeavors, 15% to look for work, and 19% for
entertainment.20 They further note that the combination of “poor internet services and
infrastructure (e.g. slow response time, network fluctuation etc), the lack of financial capacity to
pay and inaccessibility to the internet” have led to what has been called a digital divide,
separating people who have access from ICTs from those who do not. The authors call for
decentralization and the implementation of regional exchanges. While the number of computers
has increased dramatically due to both rising university enrolments and demand for internet
cafes, the infrastructure is simply not keeping up.
Many other scholars agree that cyber cafes and universities are key areas of interest in regard to
ICT connectivity and are studying these environments. Among undergraduates specifically, Ani
notes that “the use of internet in Nigerian universities among the students is pervasive and
innovative, but the problem of providing equitable, affordable and sustainable access to the
14

"Homepage - UN-OHRLLS," United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed
Countries, November 25, 2013, available at http://unohrlls.org.
15
Paul Katz and Pantelis Koutroumpis, "The economic impact of Telecommunications in Senegal," Communications
and Strategies 86 (2012): 21.
16

Ibid, 12.
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Internetworldstats.com.
20
Ani, Okon Edet, Chika Uchendu, and Emmanuel U. Atseye, "Bridging the digital divide in Nigeria: a study of
internet use in Calabar Metropolis, Nigeria,"Library management 28:6/7 (2007): 355-365.
17
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internet on different university campuses in Nigeria persists.”21 A study looking specifically at
the patronage of cyber cafes illustrates that little has changed in the past ten years. Adomi, Okiy,
and Ruteyan (correctly) predicted that until the issues poor infrastructure and prohibitive costs
were resolved on a governmental level then little would change.22 Despite these frustrations, a
recent study of university staff and students showed predominantly positive views towards the
information available on the internet.23 This “zeal” is echoed by Adetirmirin24 who discusses the
overwhelmingly positive attitudes towards ICT by Nigerian staff and students despite the
inadequate service available. However he notes that, predictably, federal and private universities
have far better service on offer.
Malaysia
As with the other, more developed countries in our study, a great deal of research examining
media use has been undertaken in Malaysia. The latest ITU data show that in 2010 there were
16.9 million internet users in Malaysia (population 26.1 million) with a penetration of around
64.6%.25 A study published in 2009 indicated that time spent on computers collectively surpasses
time spent on television or radio. A similar study indicated that Malaysians ranked third in the
world in average time spent online per week at 20 hours.26 Interestingly, while mainstream media
is state-owned and state regulated – internet-based media has remained largely unregulated.27
Germany, France and UK
A study published in 2010, carried out by TNS for the British Government, sought to better
understand media use and media consumption of British Muslims.28 Males consumed more
media than females. While the vast majority cited the newspaper and television as the most
trusted source for news, on matters of religion and history, parents were by in large the most
trusted source. Unsurprisingly, younger participants tended to engage with media for
entertainment and education more than their older counterparts. It is important to note that given
the large size of the Muslim community in Britain, there were a large number of texts written
specifically for Muslim audiences that were more trusted than ‘British’ ones.29

21

Ani, Okon E. "Internet access and use: A study of undergraduate students in three Nigerian universities." The
Electronic Library 28:4 (2010): 555-567.
22
Adomi, Esharenana E., Rose B. Okiy, and Josiah O. Ruteyan. "A survey of cybercafés in Delta State,
Nigeria." The Electronic Library 21:5 (2003): 487-495.
23
Ekwelem, Vincent O., Victoria N. Okafor, and Scholastica C. Ukwoma. "Students’ Use of Electronic Information
Sources at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka." African Journal of Library, Archives and Information Science 19:1
(2009).
24
Adetimirin, Airen Edale. "ICT literacy among undergraduates in Nigerian universities." Education and
Information Technologies 17:4 (2012): 381-397.
25
"International Telecommunications Union.
26
M. Asiuzzaman, “Media Pluralism and Development in Malaysia: A Third Eye View,” The Asian Scholar 7
(2010).
27
Ibid.
28
"RICU - British Muslim Media Consumption Report," UK Home Office, March, 2010, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/44585546/RICU-British-Muslim-Media-Consumption-Report.
29

Ibid.

29
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 6, No. 4

Rigoni suggests that the aversion to mainstream British media is due to the absence of Muslim
representation.30 Her examination suggests the environment is much the same across the UK and
France. She believes the marginalization and general treatment of Islamic issues is highly
problematic.31 While she notes the structural and contextual framework of modern journalism as
a factor, her concern is primarily focused on power of the mainstream media to shape public
opinion.32 A 2009 study conducted in the UK, Germany and France found that Muslim and nonMuslim participants alike felt that “when it comes to reporting issues related to Muslims, there
appeared to be a significant lack of trust in the mainstream media’s objectivity and fairness.”33
Moreover, 86% of Muslim participants felt the need to augment their mainstream media with socalled “minority media.”34
A series of studies have examined media usage of French-Muslims from an acculturation
perspective.35 These works illustrate how each progressive generation consumes less ethnic
media. In addition, it is suggested that religiosity plays a key role in media consumption.
Croucher et al.36 examined ethnic identification and ethnic media use between French-Muslims
and British-Muslims. The study’s findings suggested that British-Muslims were across the board,
higher consumers of ethnic media. Croucher et al.37 suggest that there are contextual reasons for
this:
“In Britain, Islam is more visible, with numerous mosques and other visible symbols not
limited by British law. However, in France such public symbols are limited by legal, tax,
and public means (Croucher, 2006). Second, as Croucher (2009) and Phillips (2006)
asserted, Britain’s Muslim population, unlike many other European nations’ Muslim
populations, has a history of higher levels of balancing ethnic identification and
assimilation. Thus, many members of this population are keen to strongly identify with
Islam and actively seek out ethnic media, whether they are a first-generation or
subsequent-generation Muslim immigrant (H1 and H2).”38
Pies questions the notion that media usage/consumption and integration are positively related: “It
is not sufficient to ask whether an Arab immigrant in Germany uses German or Arab media. In
fact you have to ask what meaning this recipient credits and its content.”39 She illustrates this
30

Rigoni, Isabelle. "Challenging notions and practices: the Muslim media in Britain and France." Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies 31:3 (2005): 563-580.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
“Muslims in the European ‘Mediascaoe’: Integration and Social Cohesion Dynamics,” Institute for Strategic
Dialogue, 2009, available at:
http://www.strategicdialogue.org/documents/isd_intranet/ISD%20muslims%20media%20WEB.pdf.
34
Ibid.
35
Croucher, Stephen M., Deepa Oommen, and Emily L. Steele. "An examination of media usage among FrenchMuslims." Journal of Intercultural Communication Research 38:1 (2009): 41-57. Croucher, Stephen M., Deepa
Oommen, Ian Borton, Samara Anarbaeva, and Jacob S. Turner. "The influence of religiosity and ethnic
identification on media use among Muslims and non-Muslims in France and Britain." Mass Communication and
Society 13:3 (2010): 314-334.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid (328).
39
Judith Pies, I Can Watch Both Sides: Media Use among Young Arabs in Germany (Boston, MA: Brill, 2008), 398
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point by juxtaposing her participants’ consumption data against their understood meanings of
such consumption. She suggests that the consumption of German media on the part of GermanMuslims may be more accurately described as an attempt to orient themselves within the cultural
landscape; as opposed to an indication of acculturation or integration.
In summary, there is some existing research on media use by Muslims, however the bulk of it is
focused on penetration of new media systems in particular countries, providing us little insight
into how these channels are actually used. Some research describes users’ reliance on particular
forms of media, but it tends to focus on particular countries and does not focus on use of the
media specifically for obtaining religious information. If we can draw any generalization from
existing research, it is that we can expect lower availability—and therefore less importance—of
“new” internet-based communication technology in less developed countries (in comparison to
Europe). In the next section we look at what is known about trust in information sources.

Muslims’ Trust in Information Sources
While little is known about Muslims’ use of particular media for religious information, even less
is known about how they evaluate sources of this information, notwithstanding the channels
through which it is transmitted. This is an important dimension of the phenomenon under study
because users might attend to communication through a particular medium but view the
information it contains with skepticism, dampening its potential for persuasion and attitude
change.
The study most directly relevant to the present effort is by Ibrahim, Noor, and Mehad.40 They
reported the results of a large (convenience) sample survey of 605 Muslim students from
Southeast Asia and the Middle East assessing their trust in online sources of Islamic information.
Results showed that over 2/3 of the respondents agreed with the statement “I can only trust the
offline form of information dissemination.” Reasons for not trusting web-based information
included the uncertain nature of the web, unreliable or inauthentic websites, poor website design,
and poor content reliability and validity.41
Fandy42 examines trust in broadcast sources in the Middle East. He argues that questionable
reporting during the 1967 war broke Arabs’ trust with local media, and forced them to look to
foreign sources, such as the BBC, for accurate information. He argues that even al-Jazeera is
questioned by many because of its ownership by the Qarati government. In addition, he says,
cultural traditions of the Arabs favor oral communication as a source of information because
trust is to some extent built-in to personal relationships through which these forms of
communication operate.

40

Emma Nuraihan Mior Ibrahim, Nor Laila Md Noor, and Shafie Mehad, "Trust or Distrust in the Web-Mediated
Information Environment (W-MIE): A Perspective of Online Muslim Users." Journal of Enterprise Information
Management 22:5 (2009): 523-547.
41
Ibid.
42
Mamoun Fandy, "Information Technology, Trust, and Social Change in the Arab World," The Middle East
Journal (2000): 378-394.
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Skuse43 reports results of a survey of radio station preferences in Afghanistan. It shows that by
large percentages both male and female listeners prefer the BBC World Service as a source of
information because it is seen as less biased and less likely to be a source of propaganda. With
regard to faith as a basis for trust, Siala, O’Keefe and Hone studied trust in online book retailers
by members of Christian, Muslim, and other faiths (the location of the participants was not
specified).44 Their hypothesis that users would trust websites from same-faith operators was
partially supported for Muslims, who placed significantly greater trust in information from
Muslim sites.
In summary, research on trust in sources is sparse, and focuses more on trust in channels than on
trust in sources per se. General conclusions we can draw are that there is low trust overall in
mediated sources, and that there may be a built-in preference for personal/oral communication
for information regarding religious issues. In the next section we describe research designed to
answer our research questions.

Methods
Survey Design
The survey is one element of a larger investigation of counter-radical discourse and praxis in
Southeast Asia, West Africa and Western Europe that also includes ethnographic and web mining
components. The larger investigation looked at the ways in which Muslim individuals and
communities respond to, and counter, radical or extremist actors (individual and organizational), and
their discourses. The complete survey contained 60 core questions, developed through collaborative
and repeated engagements of the full research team. Space does not permit complete discussion of
survey design, participants, sampling and procedures. Full details are available elsewhere.45 The
research team included scholars with backgrounds in anthropology, communications, computer
science, mathematics, religious studies and sociology. This paper reports on a number of questions in
the survey that focused on media use and trust in sources.

Participants
Two thousand eight hundred and ten Muslims in 7 countries were surveyed over a period of two
months in 2011. The surveys were conducted in France, Germany, Malaysia, Niger, Nigeria,
Senegal, and the United Kingdom (UK). The number of countries was determined by budget
constraints. The particular countries were selected on the basis of (a) size of the Muslim
population, (b) the role of religion in ethnic and political violence in the country, (c) for the
European countries, the presence of salient, active, radical groups in diaspora communities, and
(d) research accessibility and ability to secure host country permission to conduct research.46
43

Andrew Skuse, "Radio, Politics and Trust in Afghanistan A Social History of Broadcasting," International
Communication Gazette 64:3 (2002): 267-279.
44
Haytham Siala, Robert M. O'Keefe and Kate S. Hone, "The Impact of Religious Affiliation on Trust in the
Context of Electronic Commerce." Interacting with Computers 16:1 (2004): 7-27.
45
David Jacobson, Maureen Olmstead, Natalie Deckard and Mark Woodward, “Survey of Muslims in Western
Europe, West Africa, and Malaysia: Sample Characteristics,” Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict, June
2012, available at http://csrc.asu.edu/research/publications/articles/survey1-sample.
46
This last factor accounts for the inclusion of only one Southeast Asian country in the study, as it proved
impossible to secure host country permission in a timely manner in Indonesia and Singapore.
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Four-hundred individuals completed survey interviews in all countries except Malaysia, where
410 individuals completed the survey.
Sample Recruitment, Sampling Unit Selection, and Participant Eligibility
Surveys were conducted by a survey research contractor, which subcontracted with local market
research firms in each country, and used a combination of telephone and face-to-face interviews.
In countries with low telephone penetration (Malaysia, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal), multilevel
cluster sampling was used to select participants and data was collected face-to-face. In these
countries, regions with low population size and areas where on-going conflict had the potential
to put researchers at risk were eliminated from the sample.
Elsewhere (France, Germany and the UK), interviews were conducted by telephone. Here a
personal interview were not practical because of a low incidence of Muslims and a lack of
official data on this population. Accordingly, insights from ethnographers working in the region
were used to identify four strata, high incidence, medium incidence (except Germany), low
incidence, and very low incidence. In high, medium, and low incidence strata random digit
dialing was used to enroll participants. In very low incidence strata phone numbers were
randomly selected from directory listings of households with typically ethnic Muslim names.
Within eligible households the recent birthday method was used to select participants if there
was more than one eligible household member.
Eligibility criteria required that participants be over the age of 18 and report Muslim or Islam as
their religious preference. Efforts were made to ensure that the sample contain approximate equal
number of male and female respondents. Interim review of datasets revealed an imbalance
between male. Table 2 shows eligibility and participation rates for all countries.
Table 2: Sampling, Eligibility and Completion Statistics
Sampling Units Eligible
Refusals Completed
Region
Country
Selected
Households
(%)
Interviews (%)
SE
Asia/Africa
Malaysia
656
521
21.3
Niger
585
473
15.4
Nigeria
546
450
11.1
Senegal
627
555
27.9
TOTAL/AVG
2,414
1,999
18.9
Europe
France
31,110
2,961
86.5
Germany
14,929
1,692
76.4
UK
46,133
4,664
91.4
TOTAL/AVG
92,172
9,317
84.8

78.7
84.6
88.9
72.1
81.1
15.6
23.6
8.6
15.9
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Procedures
All interviewers were residents of the area and native speakers of the language in which the
interview was conducted. At first contact (whether via phone or face-to-face), the interviewers
read a script describing the project, soliciting participation, and assuring confidentiality. After
screening questions to confirm eligibility and determination/selection of the participant from the
Kish diagram or the recent birthday method, participants verbally consented and the interview
was either conducted immediately or scheduled for a later date/time. Interviews were conducted
in the interviewee’s preferred language.
Items
Two sets of survey items, along with demographic data, were used in this analysis. One set of
items sought answers about usage of different communication media for obtaining information
on faith and religious issues. The prompt asked: “Many of us rely on different kinds of sources to
learn about faith and religious issues. How often do you use the following sources to obtain
information on faith and religious issues?” The options were: Television and radio; Audio CDs,
cassettes, MP3s, videotapes, DVDs; Audio CDs, cassettes, MP3s, videotapes, DVDs; Text
messages on cell phones; Internet social networking sites; Other Internet sources (blogs, web
sites, video sharing sites); Religious services or group meetings. For each, participants were
asked to respond often, sometimes, rarely, or never.
A second set of items asked about trust in different sources. The prompt was: “On a scale of 1 to
5 where 1 means least trustworthy and 5 means most trustworthy, how much do you trust the
information on religious issues obtained from the following sources?” Here the options were:
Family members, acquaintances and friends, religious leaders and scholars,
group/political/community leaders, and journalists/broadcasters/bloggers.
Demographic data included age of the respondent, highest level of education, and standard of
living. Education is complicated because different countries have different education systems
and levels. For the purposes of these analyses education was mapped from the different
countries’ responses onto four levels: None, primary, secondary, and post-secondary. Standard
of living was measured by asking the respondent to describe his household using categories:
prosperous, living very comfortably, living reasonably comfortably, just getting along, nearly
poor, and poor.

Analysis
For each set of items, participants rated a number of related options. While it is possible to
analyze these ratings individually, it is rarely the case that a respondent always relies on one
medium for information or trusts only one kind of source. Instead, the most common responses
exhibit a mix of media and source-types. Accordingly we treated responses on the two sets of
items as profiles, and sought to determine if there were participant types based on their response
profiles.
Profiles for each pair of participants were analyzed using the SPSS two-step clustering
procedure, using a log-likelihood distance. This procedure is suitable because it supports mixedtype attributes (in this case, ordinal for the media profiles and interval for the trust profiles). In
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the first step it estimates the maximum number of clusters using a Bayesian Information
Criterion and in the second step assigns cases to cluster
clusters using ratios of the change in distance
for k-1 vs. k clusters, referred
ed to as a coherence measure, as a criterion.
Cluster
luster assignments for participants were then treated as nominal level variables
variable for the
purposes of discovering associations with demographic data
data,, and relationships between the
media and trust variables. These
se tests were performed with standard contingency table analysis.

Results
Media Use Clusters
Solutions with two to four cluster produced similar coherence measures. Reasoning that we
wanted to discriminate more rather than fewer profiles, we selected the four cluster solution.
Figure 1 shows the percentages of participants in each cluster responding at the various levels for
each media type. The colors are intended to reflect a “heat” gradient with the “often” response
being the hottest and the “never” res
response being the coldest.
Figure 1. Percentages of Item Responses for Media Clusters
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As the charts show, members of all clusters report often or sometimes obtaining information
from broadcast media. Otherwise, there are apparent differences between the groups. For ease of
reference we apply interpretive names to each of the four clusters, described as follows.
Mediaphiles make up 16% of the cases. They are so named because they generally report often
obtaining information from all of the media named, though about an equal number in this group
report never using mobile media. This group reports extremely high use of social media and
other internet sources. They also report highest of all the groups on broadcast sources. Luddites
comprise the largest group, making up 55% of the cases. They are so named because they report
rarely or never using mobile, social media, and internet sources. Substantial percentages report
rarely or never using recorded audio or print media. Mainstreamers account for 16% of the
cases. They have a similar profile to the luddites, except that they rarely, rather than never, use
recorded audio, print, mobile, and internet sources. Dabblers represent 16% of the cases. They
are distinctive in that they have a high “sometimes” response on all of the channels.
Based on similarity of the profiles, in a three-cluster solution we would expect the Luddites and
Mainstreamers to merge. A two cluster solution would have Mediaphiles vs. everyone else. As
we shall see in the contry analysis, this would essentially distinguish the European participants
from the non-European ones.
Media Cluster by Demographics
Because young people are generally considered more receptive to technology, we expected that
there would be significant age differences between the groups. A contingency table analysis of
media cluster by age group was significant, χ 2 (15) = 25.94, p < .039. However, standardized
residuals showed only one significant cell, with fewer mainstreamers than expected in the 55-64
age group. So contrary to our assumption, younger age groups were not more likely to fall into
the Mediaphile cluster.
There was no significant difference in educational level between media use clusters. There was a
significant difference in standard of living between media use clusters χ 2 (15) = 45.69, p < .0001.
Relative to expected values: (a) Mainstreamers were more likely to be living very comfortably or
just getting along, and less likely to be living reasonably confortably; (b) Mediaphiles were more
likely to be living reasonably comfortably and less likely to be living very comfortably; and (c)
Luddites were more likely to be poor or nearly poor.
Media Clusters by Country
Given the varying levels of technology penetration in the countries studied, we expected
differences in cluster membership by country. A contingency table analysis of media cluster by
country produced a large effect, χ2 = 959.183, p < .000. The Figure 2 shows the standardized
residuals, where values greater than +/- 2 are considered significant. Almost all values are
significant except the small stubs for mainstreamers in Nigeria, UK, and France and for Luddites
in Malaysia. For these cases, the numbers are approximately what one would expect given the
row and column distributions in the table. In all other cases there are more or fewer cases than
one would expect, in the magnitudes shown.
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Figure 2. Standardized Residuals for Media Cluster by Country
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Mediaphiles are concentrated in the European countries. Germany and the UK are drastically
under-represented
represented in the Luddites. Somewhat surprisingly, UK is over-represented
represented in the dabbler
cluster. Niger and Nigeria are over
over-represented
represented in the Luddite category, whereas Senegal and
Malaysia have the highest numbers of mainstreamers. The association in the table is large, φ =
0.584, meaning that about a third of the variance cluster membership is accounted for by country.
Trust Clusters
Clustering of the trust items resulted in five clusters
clusters. Figure 3 shows the average scale ratings for
the various sources for each of the clusters. Here again, we provide interpretive
ive names for ease of
reference.
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Figure 3: Mean Scale Values for Trust Clusters
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Trusting respondents represent 28% of the participants. They are characterized by high trust
ratings (above mid-scale) for all of the sources, with family, friends, and clerics scoring
somewhat higher than leaders and journalists. Clerics respondents, comprising 31% of the
sample, are noteworthy for placing trust in religious leaders and scholars above all others.
Ratings of leaders and journalists are higher than all the other clusters except trusting. Close to
Home makes up 16% of participants. This group shows an almost monotonic decline with
relationships of increasing social distance. Family/Friends/Mosque (FFM) includes 17% of
participants. This cluster has the highest average trust rating for clerics, and also high trust in
family and friends. Along with the Close to Home cluster, it gives low ratings to leaders and
journalists. Untrusting includes 8% of the respondents. They are noteworthy for their low
ratings of trust for all sources. Of these, clerics are the only group to rate above mid-scale, and
then just barely.
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Trust Clusters by Demographics
A contingency table analysis of trust clusters by each of the demographic variables was
performed. Results showed no significant differences in age, education, or standard of living
between clusters.
Trust Clusters by Country
A contingency table analysis of trust clusters by country showed, again, a very large effect,
χ2(24) = 1159.986, p < .000. The standardized residuals are shown in Figure 44,, where values
greater than +/- 2 are considered significant
significant. All of the non-European
European countries are significantly
lower than expected on the Close to Home cluster, whereas the UK and France are significantly
signifi
higher. France is also significantly higher in the untrusting cluster. The clerics
lerics cluster is higher
than expected only in Malaysia and Germany. The FFM cluster is more frequent than expected in
Senegal and Niger, and lower elsewhere.
Figure 4. Standardized Residuals for Trust Clusters by Country
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2

Senegal

Niger

Nigeria

Malaysia

cleric

closetohome

-4

United
Kingdom

France

Germany

-6
-8
-10
trusting

FFM

untrusting

Media Clusters by Trust Clusters
Contingency table analysis of media clusters by trust clusters produced a significant effect,
χ2(12) = 109.064, p < .000. Figure 5 shows the standardized residuals, wi
with
th values greater than
+/- 2 being significant. Mainstreamers are higher than expected only on the clerics cluster, and
within expectations on the others. Mediaphiles are higher than expected on the Close to Home
cluster, and lower than expected on the FFM cluster. Dabblers are higher than expected on the
Trusting and Close to Home clusters, and lower on Clerics and Friends, Family, and Mosque.
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Finally, Luddites are higher than expected on Friends, Family and Mosque, and lower on Close
to Home and Untrusting.
Figure 5. Standardized Residuals for Media Clusters by Trust Clusters
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Discussion
Our first research question asked: On what media do Muslims rely for information about
religious issues? A couple of generalizations are possible. First, broadcast media were important
sources in all the use profiles we discovered. Even in the case of the Luddites, who often
reported never using most of the other media, about 60% said they often got information about
religion from broadcast media. So broadcast would seem to be the best single medium to use if
one’s purpose is to reach Muslim audiences. Second, Muslims in the European countries were
much more likely than those in Africa or Southeast Asia to get their religious information from a
variety of different media,
dia, with the Mediaphiles concentrated there and Luddites
underrepresented. This suggests that other media besides broadcast may be useful for reaching
Muslim audiences in Europe, but are probably less effective elsewhere.
Otherwise, our results paint a surprisingly
urprisingly complex picture of media use by Muslims in the
countries studied. There is a variable pattern of consumption across different countries,
indicating that Muslims are by no means a monolithic audience, and that even differences
between developed and developing countries are not absolutely predictable
predictable. In the three African
countries, the distribution of usage profiles is fairly similar in pattern, though Senegal has more
than the expected number of mainstreamers, while Niger has significantly less, and Nigeria has
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about what we would expect. Another less developed country, Malaysia, also has many more
Mainstreamers than expected, but unlike the African countries, does not exceed the expected
number of Luddites.
The European countries are also somewhat similar in pattern, but have notable differences. The
UK is the outlier (among all countries, Europe included) in terms of numbers of dabblers,
whereas Germany has only somewhat more than expected. The UK and Germany are very low
on the number of Luddites, but the deficit in France is just barely below the significance
criterion. Germany is has significantly fewer Mainstreamers than expected, whereas the UK and
France are within expectations.
Generally speaking, our data resonate with existing scholarship in terms of media use. There are
some difficulties drawing robust conclusions for some regions, especially given the
comparatively small amount of scholarship undertaken in many African nations. In addition, we
must highlight the uniqueness of this study given that extant scholarship which has examined
media usage of Muslims around the world is for the most part focused on acculturation. To
further complicate the issue, the vast majority of the existing scholarship conducted in the UK
and Europe on media usage is positioned in terms of generation on generation acculturation and
thus focuses on generation on generation comparisons which this study did not collect.
Moreover, the focus on acculturation tends to lead scholarship to comparing the consumption of
mainstream media with ethnic media – data which this study did not collect. Despite these
factors, strong ties can be seen between our findings and previous scholarship. As discussed by
Croucher et al (2009; 2010) Muslims in the UK, France, and Germany tend to rely on sources
closer to home when it comes to cultural and religious information.
Our second research question asks: What sources do Muslims trust for information about
religious issues? One general finding is that in all profiles trust in personal contacts (family,
friends and clerics) is much higher than trust in impersonal sources (leaders and journalists). The
disparity between these two classes differs across the profiles, however, with those in the
Trusting cluster much higher than those in the other three clusters.
The largest cluster in our findings was the Clerics group, which puts relatively high trust in
clerics, family and friends, and lower trust in leaders and journalists. This is very similar to the
family, friends, and Mosque (FFM) cluster, which rates these sources near the top of the scale on
average, and leaders and journalists even lower than the clerics cluster. Together these clusters
make up almost 50% of the sample, and bears out conclusions from some of the existing research
that Muslims have a preference for personal sources.
The other clusters violate this principle in different ways. Members of the Trusting cluster,
making up 28% of the sample, rate personal sources higher than impersonal ones, but only
moderately so, and all of the averages are well above the midpoint of the scale. The Close to
Home cluster, with 16% of the respondents, shows high trust in family members, but diminishing
trust with increasing social distance. Clerics, leaders and journalists all average below the
midpoint of the scale. Finally the 8% in the Untrusting cluster seem to view everyone except
clerics with suspicion, and clerics only average slightly above the midpoint of the scale.
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Looking at source trust by country, the developing countries are all low on the Close to Home
and Untrusting clusters and otherwise are a mixed bag. The FFM cluster is centered primarily in
Senegal and Niger, whereas the trusting cluster is highest in Nigeria and the Clerics cluster is
highest in Malaysia. The European countries do not show a consistent pattern. France is
particularly notable for extremely high residuals on the Close to Home and Untrusting clusters,
and an extremely low residual on the Trusting cluster. Clearly there is something unique about
France with regard to source trust that bears further investigation.
Our third research question asks: What is the relationship between media relied upon and trust in
sources? Here there seems to be a rather clear pattern. Mainstreamers have no significant
residuals, meaning they are distributed across the trust clusters more or less proportional to the
percentages of those in the sample. They are highest of all the clusters, and nearly significant, on
the Clerics profile.
Mediaphiles are extremely high on the Close to Home trust profile, so those who rely on a
variety of media trust family members most and everyone else in a declining pattern with social
distance. Recall that these participants were largely in Europe, so this pattern suggests that
radicalization on the continent may be more difficult, as it depends on impersonal sources that
these participants tend to distrust.
Dabblers, who are over-represented in the UK, are high on Trusting and Close to Home and low
on Clerics and FFM. This indicates something of a split in that country, with some people
placing high trust in all sources, and others trusting primarily family members. It is possible that
the latter group represents recent immigrants, an issue that may bear further research.
Finally Luddites are the highest of all the other clusters on the FFM trust profile, indicating trust
in personal relationships and distrust in impersonal ones. They are lowest on the Close to Home
profile, making them almost a mirror image of the Mediaphiles and Dabblers. Given that these
respondents were concentrated in the developing countries, there is further evidence of a distinct
use and trust profile here compared to Europe.
An important limitation of the study is that it was based on a mixed sampling methodology.
Random-digit-dialing telephone surveys were conducted in Europe, whereas personal interviews
were conducted in the developing countries. This was done for practical reasons: The sparser
Muslim population in Europe made the personal interview approach cost prohibitive and
impractical. Still we must acknowledge that the differences we found between the developing
and developed countries may be due, at least in part, to the different methods used to collect the
data.

Conclusion
This study begain with the observation that little is known about how Muslims consume media
and what sources they trust, despite the fact that media use is believed to be a key factor in
radicalization. A review of existing literature showed that what is known primarily takes for
form of international government studies of Internet penetration. We addressed that gap by
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reporting results of a large, random sample survey of Muslims in seven countries. We found that
responses clustered into four distinct profiles for media use, and five for source trust.
We also found that the size of these clusters differed significantly by country. All countries
repored substantial use of traditional mass media, which implies that this is still the best overall
source for influence activities. However respondents in Africa had low use of other forms of
media including mobile and Internet media, whereas European respondent had much higher use
of other forms of “new” media. This implies that multiple-medium campaigns are more likely to
be successful in Europe than elsewhere. Contrary to expextations, younger people were not
likely to be more avid comsumers of different types of media. However, as expected, media
variety was related to standard-of-living. With regard to the trust clusters, respondents were
generally less trusting of sources the less personally close those sources were.
The big picture painted by these results is that personal relationships are the main conduit
through which Muslims obtain trusted information about religious issues. Over half of the
respondents, in the Luddites profile, rely primarily on mass media for their information about
religious matters, paying little attention to other sources. At the same time, they place relatively
low trust in sources who use that channel. On the other end of the use continuum, the
Mediaphiles are the most eclectic in their media use, but are also the most likely to have the
Close to Home trust profile, which shows declining trust in sources with increasing social
distance. The implication is that that media are not good vehicles for influencing these audiences,
and that more effort should be placed on personal engagement if the goals is to persuade people
to resist extremist ideas and positions.
It is something of a puzzle, then, that strategic communicators for both extremists and counterextremists place so much emphasis on the media. It is possible that the results of this study do
not generalize to all Muslims; however, our use of a large random sample suggest they probably
do, at least for the countries studied. It is also possible that strategic communicators have been
caught up in new media hype. But a more interesting possibility is that media messages can
influence a select few, who then persuade others through personal communication. This is Katz
and Lazarsfeld’s old idea of a two-step-flow in mass communication.47 This implies that media
efforts to resist extremism shold not be so much concerned with mass appeals, but should
precisely target opinion leaders and encourage them to influence others.

47

Katz, Elihu, and Paul Felix Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence, The part played by people in the flow of mass
communications (Piscataway NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1970).
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